Most mutual funds belong to fund families, yet little is known of the influence of family membership on fund strategy and performance. We examine the extent to which a fund's cash inflows are affected by the performance of other funds in the family -and the consequences of such spillover effects. The cash flow response to fund performance has been documented to be asymmetric, suggesting that even stand-alone funds may seek to create 'stars' to attract large cash inflows. We argue that for a family with positive spillover effects between funds, the impact of a star performer is amplified. This can increase the incentives to both pursue star-driven strategies and to increase the size of the family. Our empirical results indicate a strong positive spillover effect from star fund performers, resulting in higher cash inflow for other funds in the family as well. We show that the probability of obtaining a star performance is increasing in family size and in the negative correlation of fund returns. However, factors that increase the odds of producing a star fund and, potentially, attracting more cash inflow to a fund family -are also found to be factors associated with a lower average performance. Hence, a star-based marketing strategy, presumably aimed at less informed investors, does them no favor.
Introduction
Most mutual funds are members of fund families.
1 There are good reasons for this:
a family structure brings economies of scale to the distribution, servicing, and promotion of funds. Compared to stand alone funds, a family has greater flexibility in reallocating its human and other resources in response to market opportunities. A family's reputation can help to reassure investors about the selection and monitoring of investment managers.
Despite the prevalence of the family organization, little research has been done on the consequences or importance of family membership. The literature has, for the most part, treated funds as though they were stand alone entities. This is inappropriate if there are significant spillover effects between funds in a family -e.g., good
performance by a fund benefits other funds in the family as well. This can happen if, for instance, good performance by a fund raises investor perception about the quality of the fund family overall. Hence, without an understanding of performance and strategy at the level of the fund family, we are potentially ignoring significant influences on the behavior and performance of individual funds as well.
It is well documented in the literature that investors appear to respond asymmetrically to the performance of a fund. 2 A strongly performing fund attracts a disproportionate inflow of funds, relative to the cash outflow when performance is poor (see Figure 1 ). While the reasons for such a pattern are not well understood, 3 the convex (call-option-like) response to fund performance suggests that individual funds may seek variance increasing strategies to increase expected cash inflow. When 1 funds are in a family structure, possible spillover effects between funds can further amplify the benefit of a star performer.
The implication, therefore, is that if there are positive spillover effects between funds in a family, this increases the incentive to pursue a star-driven strategy. The stronger the spillover effect, the greater the incentive to increase family size -both to increase the probability of creating a star and to have more funds benefit from star performance. Of course, enthusiasm for a star performer would be considerably diminished if, for instance, the bulk of the new funds the star attracted were cannibalized from other funds in its family.
We investigate the question whether there are intra-family spillover effects and, specifically, whether a star performer affects the flow of new money, to itself and to other funds in the family. For our empirical analysis, we use data from Morningstar over the period 1992 − 1998 that provides information on family identity. We define a star as a fund that has a risk-adjusted performance that puts it among the top 100 performers in the year.
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Our results confirm that there is a strong positive spillover effect from having a star performer in the family. Overall, the monthly new money growth for star families (families that have a star fund) is significantly higher than for families with no stars. The spillover effect is such that, compared to a stand alone fund, the fund inflows resulting from a star performance are about 40 to 120 percent larger for a typical family with seven member funds. The effect is present in the year of the star performance and for the year after.
Given the large positive spillover effect, the incentives are, presumably, in the direction of increasing family size, to capture the benefits from a star performance, even if it comes at the expense of having a family size that may be larger than optimal.
The increase in family size can, in turn, make a star performance more likely. Other actions taken by a family to enhance the probability of obtaining a star, say the investment strategies it follows, may come at the expense of performance as well.
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To determine the consequences of a star strategy, we identify factors that affect the likelihood of producing a star. Using logistic regressions, one for each sample year, it is shown that there are two primary factors that a family can reasonably control that raise the probability of having a star in the family -these involve increasing the number of funds and decreasing the correlation between fund returns in the family.
From an investor's perspective, should a fund be expending effort to generate more stars or does this come at the cost of a poorer performance. This is the issue we investigate next. Controlling for other factors that have been shown to affect performance -such as turnover and expense ratios -we find that families with star performers in a particular period do not have higher returns in the subsequent period.
The implications for investors are worse than that, however. It appears that the very factors that increase the probability of producing star performers, are associated with a worse family performance.
The finding that families with star performers deliver lower returns to investors may reflect the costs of implementing a star-oriented strategy. The costs may be due to the cost of adding funds, beyond the number that can be effectively monitored or managed. It may also reflect that in trying to create stars, the family may deviate from value maximizing investment strategies, getting investment managers to take negatively correlated positions, to increase the odds of producing at least one star.
The bottom line is that factors that are effective in generating stars and attracting new money -are also ones associated with a lower average performance. Hence, a star based marketing strategy presumably targeted to the less informed investors, does them no favor.
While the paper investigates the impetus for some families to engage in star-based strategies, there is clearly substantial heterogeneity in strategies followed by fund families. In contrast to families following star-based strategies, it is plausible that other families use the family structure as a way of sharing and developing valuable investment information across funds, reflected in terms of a positive correlation in their risk-adjusted returns. Their investors may be the more sophisticated ones, not prone to chasing star performers.
There are policy implications of a general nature arising from the findings in the paper. To discourage fund families from following star-driven strategies, at the expense of less sophisticated investors, more disclosure can help. For instance, fund families could be required to disclose features of their overall performance, in addition to any other information that is publicized. Naturally, this would include information on merged and defunct funds.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the extensive literature on mutual funds and its relation to our paper. We describe our data and empirical approach in section 3. We present our empirical findings in section 4, and conclude in section 5.
Literature Review
It is well documented in the literature that investors tend to chase past fund performance. Earlier studies report a positive linear relation between fund performance and new money flows. Recent studies have, however, documented a nonlinear relation between performance and new money flows. The nonlinear cash flow response to performance for our sample is indicated in Figure 1 . As is apparent, the growth in cash inflows appears disproportionately greater for funds performing in the top deciles. As we will argue, the (convex) flow-performance relation can provide incentives to fund and family managers to adopt certain strategies in an effort to maximize expected cash inflows.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that mutual fund investors chase fund per- There are only a few papers that study the decisions at the level of the mutual fund complex. Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1993) discuss the notion that fund complexes maximize the probability of having a fund at the top of the rankings by managing many funds, and by minimizing cross-fund correlations. Khorana and Servaes (1999) studies the decisions by fund families on starting new funds. Khorana and Servaes (2000) analyze the determinants that drive market share in the mutual fund industry.
They find that families that charge lower fees, perform better, offer a wider range of products, and start more funds relative to the competition tend to have a larger market share. In our paper, we investigate how a star performer affects the cash inflows to itself as well as to other funds in the same family, what family strategies maximize the likelihood of producing stars, and how the star-based marketing strategy affects the welfare of mutual fund investors. For our study we include all diversified equity funds over the period January 1992 to December 1998, for which fund complex information, monthly fund total net assets (TNA), monthly fund returns, and annual fund characteristics (turnover ratio, expense ratio, load, etc.) are available. To be consistent with earlier mutual fund papers, the sample excludes sector funds, international funds and balanced funds. 
Definition of variables
To measure the performance of a mutual fund family, we calculate the weighted average of three-factor adjusted returns of all member funds within the family. For robustness, we also compute one-factor adjusted returns and raw returns to measure fund and family performance. These alternative measures are defined later. For each member fund, the three-factor adjusted returns are estimated by using the Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and French (1993) ). Specifically, we use the following OLS regressions to estimate fund factor loadings and α measures:
where R it is the rate of return of fund i in month t, R f t is the risk-free interest rate in month t, R mt is the rate of return of the market in month t, RMRF t ≡ R mt − R f t is the excess market return in month t, SMB t is the rate of return on the mimicking portfolio for the common size factor in stock returns in month t, HML t is the rate of return on the mimicking portfolio for the common book-to-market equity factor in stock returns in month t, α is the excess return of the corresponding factor model and βs are the factor loadings of the corresponding factors. Using the estimated factor loadings (βs) and excess return α, we define the three-factor adjusted return (α it ) for fund i in month t as
We then compute the three-factor adjusted return α f t of fund family f in month t as the weighted average of three-factor adjusted returns of all member funds within family f :
where TNA it is the total net assets of fund i in month t, and n is the total number of member funds within family f .
The new money or cash flow of a mutual fund family is calculated as the sum of new money of all member funds. For each member fund, new money is defined to be the dollar change in TNA, net of price appreciation in the fund assets. Assuming that new money is invested at the end of each month, the cash flow for fund i in month t is given by
Normalizing the new money by TNA in the previous month gives a measure for new money growth:
For any mutual fund family f , the family-level new money and new money growth are calculated as
Newmoney it ,
As discussed in the introduction, alternative strategies are available to managers of a mutual fund family. If a family adopts a star-based marketing strategy and tries to enhance the probability of creating star funds, we expect to observe relatively high cross-sectional variation in the performance of its member funds. On the other hand, a relatively low variation in fund-level returns may indicate sharing of information and coordination among member funds. Hence, a natural proxy for the strategy played by family management is the standard deviation of fund-level returns. For any fund family f in month t, we calculate the cross-fund standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns Stdev f t as
where α f t is the mean of three-factor adjusted returns of all member funds within family f in month t.
The family-level turnover ratio, expense ratio, and front-end load are calculated as the weighted average of the corresponding fund-level measures. The weights used here are fund-level TNAs.
Finally, we need a procedure to identify star funds. For each year in the sample period, we calculate the monthly average three-factor adjusted return for each fund.
The 100 funds (about 5% of the sample) with the highest monthly average returns are then defined as the star funds for that year. For any given year, a fund family is called a star family if it has at least one star fund under management. Otherwise, it is called a nonstar family.
As mentioned, as a robustness check, we also use different measures of returns to evaluate fund performance. These alternative measures include one-factor adjusted returns and raw returns. The one-factor adjusted returns for each fund are estimated by using the single (market) factor model. Specifically, we use the following OLS regression to estimate fund factor loadings and α measures:
With the estimated factor loading β and excess return α, we define the one-factor adjusted return for fund i in month t as in equation (2). Using the fund-level one-9 factor adjusted returns, we then calculate the family-level one-factor adjusted returns as in equation (3) and the cross-fund standard deviation of one-factor adjusted returns as in equation (8). In case of raw returns, the family-level raw return measure is simply the weighted average of raw returns (R it ) of all member funds within the family, and the cross-fund standard deviation of raw returns is defined similarly as in equation (8).
To examine whether the results are sensitive to alternative ranking mechanisms, we also identify the star performers by ranking the one-factor adjusted returns and raw returns. For any given year, the star funds are defined as the top 100 performers with the highest monthly average one-factor adjusted (or raw) returns. Table I provides the annual summary statistics for mutual fund families. The number of fund families in the sample increases from 354 in 1992 to 437 in 1998. The average size of fund families has become larger over time in terms of both the number of member funds and the total net assets under family management. The average number of funds managed by a family was 4.15 in 1992. In 1998, this number has increased to 7.30. On average, the TNA managed by a fund family has increased almost five times, from 865.43 million dollars in 1992 to 4014.89 million dollars in 1998. Moreover, the average TNA per member fund also exhibits a dramatic increase over the sample period. The family turnover ratios exhibit an increasing trend, indicating that fund families are, on average, trading more actively than in the past. The expense ratios appear quite stable over the sample period, while the average front-end loads have decreased from 1.86% to 1.12%. The last two columns of the table report the summary statistics for three-factor adjusted returns and cross-fund standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns. For all years in the sample period (except 1993), the fund families on average earned negative three-factor adjusted returns. Overall, the average standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns exhibits an increasing trend. cross-fund standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns, family turnover ratio, family expense ratio and family front-end load. For each family, the above characteristics are calculated by taking monthly averages over the entire sample period. As indicated, family size is inversely related to the expense ratio, suggesting that large fund families may benefit from economies of scale. New money growth is found to be positively correlated with both family performance and the standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns. This suggests that fund families that perform better or adopt star-based marketing strategies tend to attract more cash inflows. However, the estimated correlation coefficients should be interpreted with caution since all the family characteristics are time-series averages and thus are highly aggregated.
Summary statistics
Clearly, a lot of information, especially time-series information, may have been lost in the aggregation process. For our empirical analysis we, therefore, adopt the more appropriate panel regression approach. 
Here, f is the index for fund family, t is the index for month, α f captures the family fixed effect. Other than the variables indicating star performance, the other variables are similar to those found in other studies of the performance-flow relation. On the RHS, the variable (Newmoneygrowth) is given by equation (7), (Three-factor Adjusted Return) by equation (3) In Table III , columns one and four present the estimation results for panel regression (10). The coefficients on the star family dummies are positive and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that having a star fund increases the total level of new money flows for the entire family in both the current and the subsequent year.
Specifically, the new money growth for star families is, on average, 0.80 percent (per month) higher than that for nonstar families in both years. Given the average family TNA (4015 million dollars) at the end of 1998, this implies that a star family, on average, attracts 32 million dollars more than a nonstar family on a monthly basis.
The results indicate that families with star funds receive additional cash inflows in both the current and the subsequent years. The persistence of the cash flow response may reflect the continued publicity and promotion of the star performance by the fund family in an effort to attract investor funds.
To control for the effect of performance and other family characteristics on family new money flows, we include the lagged family cash flow, the lagged three-factor adjusted return of the family, the lagged cross-fund standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns, the lagged total number of member funds in the family, the lagged turnover ratio, expense ratio and front-end load. Consistent with earlier fund-level studies, family cash flows are positively related to past performance and past cash flows, and are negatively related to front-end load. The results indicate that, when evaluating a fund family, investors care about its past performance and are sensitive to its load structure.
To check for robustness, we reestimate panel regression (10) by replacing threefactor adjusted returns with one-factor adjusted returns and raw returns. The crossfund standard deviation of returns are also adjusted accordingly. When one-factor adjusted returns are used in the regression, the star funds and star families are identified by ranking the one-factor adjusted returns. Similar treatment is applied when raw returns are used in the regression. Columns two and five contain coefficient estimates when one-factor adjusted returns are adopted in the regression, while columns three and six document the results when raw returns are used. Clearly, the coefficient estimates from all regressions are similar both qualitatively and quantitatively, indicating that the results are not particularly sensitive to different performance measures and star ranking procedures.
The star-fund effect on fund-level new money growth
Panel regression (10) affirms the star-fund effect on the new money growth at the family level. We now turn to the issue of whether a star fund helps attract greater cash inflows to nonstar funds in its family. If the brand (or reputation) effect of having a star fund spills over to the nonstar members in the same family, we should expect to see higher new money growth for the nonstar funds in star families than for similarly situated funds in nonstar families. On the other hand, if the cash inflows to star funds are largely the consequence of cannibalizing cash flow from other funds in the same family, the new money growth for nonstar funds in star families may well be lower.
To investigate such spillover effects, we estimate the following fixed effect panel regression by utilizing fund-level information and by explicitly taking into account 14 whether a particular fund belongs to a star family or not: 
In the above regression, i is the index for individual fund, t is the index for month, identified by ranking the three-factor adjusted returns. As before, the regressions are estimated allowing for autocorrelation (AR1) in the residuals and heteroscedasticity in the variance of funds (panel). In the presence of significant spillover, the coefficient estimates of β 6 and β 7 are predicted expected to capture the spillover effects of star funds on the cash flow of nonstar funds in the same family. A significant spillover effect will be indicated by the coefficients being positive and significant.
In Table IV , columns one and four report estimation results from panel regression (11). The coefficient estimates for both the star fund dummies and the star family dummies are positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The new money growth for a star fund is, on average, 2.57 percent (per month) higher than that for a nonstar fund in the year the fund is a star performer. In the subsequent year, the star fund continues to attract more cash inflows (1.51 percent higher per month) when compared to nonstar funds. More interestingly, the star identity of a family also brings more cash inflows to its nonstar member funds. In the year when the family becomes a star, the new money growth for its nonstar member funds is, on average, 0.22 percent (per month) higher than that for other nonstar funds. In the subsequent year, the nonstar funds in star families continue to experience higher (0.27 percent per month) new money growth than other nonstar funds. Hence, both the star and nonstar funds in a star family attract more cash inflows in the current and subsequent years. As one might expect, the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that a star fund attracts more new money than a nonstar fund that belongs to a star family.
The above results confirm the notion that creating a star fund has positive spillover effects on other funds in the family. For perspective, note that the average fund family has about seven members in 1998. Assuming that the TNAs of all member funds are the same, the spillover effect is such that, compared to a stand alone fund, the overall fund inflows from a star performance in the context of an average family are about 40 percent larger in the current year and 120 percent larger in the subsequent year.
Hence, the magnitude of the spillover effect appears substantial and could well affect decisions regarding the number of funds in a family and the introduction of new funds. To examine whether the regression results are sensitive to different performance measures and star ranking mechanisms, we reestimate panel regression (11) by using one-factor adjusted returns and raw returns instead of three-factor adjusted returns.
When one-factor adjusted returns are used in the regression, the star funds and star families are identified by ranking the one-factor adjusted returns. Similar treatment is applied when raw returns are used in the regression. The coefficient estimates are reported in columns two and five and columns three and six of (1973) . The results (not reported in this paper) confirm our conclusion that there is a strong positive spillover effect from a star performer at the family level.
To summarize the above results, we find evidence indicating that: 1) having a star fund significantly increases the family-level new money flows in both the current and subsequent years; 2) funds that belong to star families attract significantly greater amount of new money than funds that belong to nonstar families in both the current and subsequent years; 3) star funds attract significantly greater amount of new money than nonstar funds in both the current and subsequent years.
What Makes A Star?
The cash flow patterns discussed in the previous section indicate that a family is well rewarded in terms of new cash inflows for producing a star fund. Surely this may encourage families to seek ways to 'create' one or more star funds -even if it does little to improve average fund performance. What types of choices are, in practice, available to fund families to enhance the odds of producing stars? We approach this by investigating family characteristics tend to be related to the creation of star funds. 7 Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1993) point out that the collection of mutual funds under management by a fund family resembles a portfolio of options due to the high payoffs of a star fund. As such, the value of the portfolio is maximized by increasing the variance of individual fund performance For each year in the sample period, we apply a logit model to explore the relationship between the probability of creating star funds and the following family-level factors: standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns, relative size of the family, total number of funds within the family, family turnover ratio, family expense ratio, and family front-end load. The relative size of family f in month t is measured by Family Size f t = (average TNA per member fund) f t Median(average TNA per member fund) t .
Hence, we measure the size of a family by its average TNA per member fund relative to the industry median.
For the purpose of our empirical study, we estimate the following logistic regression model:
Here, f is the index for fund family, S f is an indicator variable that equals one if the family has at least one star fund and zero otherwise. If adopting the star-based marketing strategy and having more member funds under management help a family to increase its odds of creating stars, then the coefficient estimates for β 1 and β 3 are expected to be positive and significant. Given all and decreasing the correlations across funds. They also hypothesize that the more funds a family manages, the higher the probability that one of them will be a winner, if only due to pure luck. Other factors may also affect the likelihood of creating a star fund. For example, higher research effort or expenses may increase the likelihood of creating a star fund.
the coefficient estimates from the logistic model, we can also estimate the probability of creating a star fund for family f by using the following formula (see Maddala (1983)):
where X f is simply the right hand side of equation (13) with βs replaced by their maximum likelihood estimates.
In Table V , we present the results of logistic regression (13). Among the six characteristics examined, the standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns and the number of funds under family control have consistent and positive impact on the probability of creating star funds over the sample period. The average coefficient estimates for these two factors are 122.94 and 0.83, respectively. The t-statistics indicate that they are significant at the 5 percent level for almost all years in the sample period.
For perspective on how the changes in standard deviation and the number of member funds affect the probability of creating star funds, let us construct a hypothesized family and use the average coefficient estimates reported in column eight of Table V to calculate the probability. All the six characteristics for the hypothesized family are evaluated at the mean statistics for fund families used in the logistic regression for 1998. Specifically, the cross-fund standard deviation of returns and the number of member funds for this hypothesized family are 1.51% and 7.35, respectively. Using formula (14), we find that the probability of creating a star fund is 0.32. If the family management decides to increase the cross-fund standard deviation of returns by 100 percent while keeping everything else unchanged, then the probability of creating a star fund will increase to 0.75. The impact of the number of member funds is smaller but still economically significant. If the family doubles the number of funds under control, the probability of creating a star will increase from 0.32 to 0.46.
For robustness check purposes, we also estimate the logistic regression (13) using alternative measures of the cross-fund standard deviation of returns: standard deviation of one-factor adjusted returns and standard deviation of raw returns. The coefficient estimates are reported in Tables VI and VII, and are qualitatively similar to those in Table V . Hence, the logistic results are not sensitive to how we measure the standard deviation of returns.
Another approach to exploring the relationship between family characteristics and the creation of star funds is to perform a Poisson regression. Instead of relating family characteristics to the probability of creating a star fund, the Poisson regression examines which family characteristics are critical to determining the expected number of star funds in the fund family.
We assume that the numbers of star funds S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N for fund family 1, 2, ..., N have independent Poisson distributions with parameters λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ N , respectively.
Hence,
where r is the observed number of star funds managed by family f . Further, we assume that λ f is log-linear in family characteristics such that
Table VIII presents the maximum likelihood estimation results for the above model. Again, the standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns and the number of member funds are the most important factors determining the expected number of star funds in the fund family. The coefficient estimates for the two factors are positive and significant at the 5 percent level for all years in the sample period. These further confirm the result that a family can increase the odds of producing stars by increasing the cross-fund standard deviation of returns and by adding more funds under control.
In summary, the results from logistic and Poisson regressions indicate that (a) a diversified strategy (high cross-fund standard deviation of returns) helps to produce star funds, and (b) the more member funds a family has, the more likely it is to produce a star fund. Other characteristics, such as family size, turnover ratio, expense ratio, and front-end load, are not significantly related to the likelihood of having a star fund.
Do stars live up to investor expectations?
The cash flow patterns we find suggest that investors are bullish on the investment skills of the star fund manager and of the fund family in general. As we have discussed fund families can affect the odds of producing stars and, potentially, benefit from engaging in what is, in effect, a star-centered marketing strategy. There is suggestive time series evidence about the increasing popularity of such strategies. From 1992 to 1998, the average number of funds managed by families and the average cross-fund standard deviation of returns have both increased (see Figures 2 and 3) . While the evidence is only suggestive, it is consistent with the greater recognition by mutual fund families that investors highly reward star funds and families that produce star funds. We now turn to the welfare consequences of a star-based marketing strategy for mutual fund investors. Specifically, we focus on whether effort of generating star funds by families comes at the cost of poorer overall family performance.
To examine the star-fund effect on family performance, we estimate the following fixed effect panel regression:
All variables in the above regression have been defined earlier in connection with regression (10). The coefficient estimates of β 2 and β 3 indicate the effect of adopting a star-based marketing strategy based on increasing cross-fund standard deviation of returns and the number of member funds on the overall family performance. The coefficient estimate of β 7 sheds light on how the existence of star funds in the current year is related to family performance in the subsequent year. If investors adopt the strategy of following the stars and invest in last year's star families, then β 7
can help us to understand whether such a strategy pays off for investors. To examine whether the regression results are sensitive to alternative return measures and ranking mechanisms, we conduct robustness check similar to that applied to panel regression (10).
In Table IX , columns one and four report the coefficient estimates for panel regression (17). Columns two and five and columns three and six present results when one-factor adjusted returns and raw returns are used instead of three-factor adjusted returns to compute the cross-fund standard deviation of returns and to identify star families. As can be seen from the table, the coefficient estimates are very similar across all three regressions. In the following analysis, we will focus on discussing the results presented in column four.
We find that the coefficient estimate on the lagged star dummy is negative and not statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence that having a star fund implies better future family performance! Recall that a significant portion of new money flows into star families in the subsequent year. Hence, these money flows do not seem to catch the "hot hands". Moreover, we find that the estimated coefficients for the cross-fund standard deviation of three-factor adjusted returns and the number of funds are negative and significant (-0.055 and -0.001, respectively). Therefore, factors that contribute the most in generating star funds appear to be associated with poorer overall family performance. This could imply that there are costs in connection with implementing a star-oriented strategy. For instance, the negative impact of number of member funds on the family performance may reflect a family management's decision to expand the fund family, beyond a number that can be effectively monitored or managed. This will induce higher agency costs and thus reduce the overall family performance. Recall from section 4.2, another effective way to increase the odds of producing stars is to increase the cross-fund standard deviation of returns. Family management can achieve this by getting investment managers to take negatively correlated positions. However, such investment strategies are unlikely to be consistent with fund value maximization.
In addition to the panel regression approach, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression coefficients. The results (not reported in this paper) confirm our conclusion that the strategy of following the star does not pay off to investors.
In summary, star families do not deliver better performance in the subsequent year. Strategies associated with producing stars tend to put a drag on average fund performance. Therefore, a strategy of "following stars" is not one that favors mutual fund investors.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of family structure on fund strategy to attract investor funds. First, we examine whether a star performer affects the flow of funds, not only to itself, but also to other funds in the family. Second, we identify the factors that affect the probability of producing star funds. Third, we investigate the costs, if any, associated with a star-driven strategy.
Our results indicate that there is a strong positive spillover effect from a star performer at the family level. The existence of a star helps itself as well as other funds in the star family to attract more money inflows. Investors respond to a star performance by investing more money into the star fund and star family in both the current and subsequent year. Given that the average family has seven funds, the overall fund inflows to the family from a star performance are about 40 percent larger in the current year and 120 percent larger in the subsequent year when compared to a stand alone fund.
We apply logistic regressions and Poisson regressions to determine the factors that may be effective in producing a star. Evidence shows that there are two primary factors that a family can reasonably control that would raise the probability of creating a star -increases in the number of member funds and decreases in the correlation between fund returns.
Finally, we document that families with star performers in a particular year do not have higher returns in the subsequent year. Hence, the strategy of following the stars does not pay off to investors. The implications for these investors are worse than that, however. It appears that factors (increasing the cross-fund standard deviation of returns and number of member funds) that enhance the odds of producing stars are associated with a significantly poorer overall performance for the fund family. These results are confirmed by several robustness checks, employing alternative definitions of fund and family performance.
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Table I. Mutual Fund Family Annual Summary Statistics, 1992-1998
The table reports annual summary statistics for mutual fund families in the period of 1992-1998. For each year in the sample period, the table shows the mean and standard deviation of the following family characteristics: the number of mutual fund families, the average number of funds within a family, the monthly average family new money growth (%), the monthly average family TNA (in million dollars), the monthly average TNA (in million dollars) per fund within a family, the monthly average family turnover ratio, the monthly average family expense ratio (%), the monthly average family front-end load (%), the monthly average family risk-adjusted return (%), and the monthly average family standard deviation of risk-adjusted returns (%). The table examines the star-fund effect on family-level new money growth. All coefficient estimates are from fixed effect panel regressions adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is family-level new money growth. The independent variables include: family-level new money growth, family-level return, family-level standard deviation of returns across member funds, logarithm of number of funds within the family, family-level turnover ratio, expense ratio, and front-end load, and dummies indicating whether the family has at least one star fund in the current and previous years. Except dummies for star family, all independent variables are lagged one period. The coefficient estimates from three panel regressions are reported in the table. The first regression uses the Fama-French three factor model to measure the risk-adjusted returns and the corresponding standard deviation of returns. In any given year, a family is identified as a star family if it contains at least one star performer ranked by the risk-adjusted returns. The second regression uses the CAPM to measure the market-adjusted returns and the corresponding standard deviation of returns. In any given year, a family is identified as a star family if it contains at least one star performer ranked by the market-adjusted returns. The third regression simply uses the raw returns and the corresponding standard deviation of returns. In any given year, a family is identified as a star family if it contains at least one star performer ranked by the raw returns.
Dependent Variable Family New Money
Growth ( The table examines the star-fund effect on fund-level new money growth. All coefficient estimates are from fixed effect panel regressions adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is fund-level new money growth. The independent variables include: fund-level new money growth, fund-level return, fund-level turnover ratio, expense ratio, and front-end load, and dummies indicating whether the fund is a star fund in the current and previous years. Except dummies for star fund, all independent variables are lagged one period. The coefficient estimates from three panel regressions are reported in the table. The first regression uses the Fama-French three factor model to measure the risk-adjusted returns. In any given year, the top 100 performers ranked by the risk-adjusted returns are identified as the star funds. The second regression uses the CAPM to measure the market-adjusted returns. In any given year, the top 100 performers ranked by the market-adjusted returns are identified as the star funds. The third regression simply uses the raw returns to measure fund performance. In any given year, the top 100 performers ranked by the raw returns are identified as the star funds. The table examines what family characteristics are more likely to create star funds. All parameter estimates are from logistic regressions. T-statistics are in the parentheses. For each year from 1992 to 1998, we apply a logit model to examine how family characteristics are related to the probability of creating star funds. The family characteristics included in the analysis are standard deviation of raw returns, relative size of the family, logarithm of the number of member funds under family management, family-level turnover ratio, expense ratio, and front-end load. The last column of the The table examines the star-fund effect on family-level performance. All coefficient estimates are from fixed effect panel regressions adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is family-level risk-adjusted return. The independent variables include: family-level risk-adjusted return, standard deviation of returns across member funds, logarithm of number of funds within the family, family-level turnover ratio, expense ratio, and front-end load, and dummies indicating whether the family has at least one star fund in the current and previous years. Except dummies for star family, all independent variables are lagged one period. The coefficient estimates from three panel regressions are reported in the table. In the first regression (3-factor), risk-adjusted returns from the Fama-French three-factor model are used to compute the family-level standard deviation of returns across member funds. In any given year, a family is identified as a star family if it contains at least one star performer ranked by the risk-adjusted returns. In the second regression (CAPM), market-adjusted returns from the CAPM are used to compute the family-level standard deviation of returns across member funds. In any given year, a family is identified as a star family if it contains at least one star performer ranked by the market-adjusted returns. In the third regression (Raw), raw returns are used to compute the family-level standard deviation of returns across member funds. In any given year, a family is identified as a star family if it contains at least one star performer ranked by the raw returns. 
